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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: Since the introduction of the Health 
Insurance Act in the Netherlands in 2006, insur- 
ers are incentivized to compete on prices for 
basic health insurance, and on price and quality 
for supplementary insurance. The new health in- 
surance system aimed to create a more com- 
petitive market in which consumers would 
switch health plans, thereby stimulating insur-
ers to price competition and quality improve- 
ment. This article evaluates the switching be-
havior of Dutch consumers and evaluates whe- 
ther this behavior is advantageous to the goals 
of the reform. Methods: Three surveys were con- 
ducted: from 2005-2006 (n = 478), 2008-2009 (n = 
389), and 2010-2011 (n = 191). Results: In 2005- 
2006, almost 20 percent of the Dutch consumers 
switched their insurance company. In between 
2006 and 2012, however, the percentage of switch- 
ers decreased to less than four percent. The main 
cause of this decrease is that consumers no 
longer perceive sufficient differences between 
insurance companies in terms of premium and 
service. In addition, consumers have difficulties 
finding the proper information making the right 
decision and believe they may not be accepted 
for the supplementary insurance. Consequently, 
insurance companies only perceive limited in- 
centives to create a more competitive market. 
Conclusion: Clear and unambiguous information, 
combined with an obligatory acceptance for the 
supplementary insurance might help to improve 
the potential mobility of Dutch consumers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the 2006 reform the Netherlands had a com-
plex, mixed public and private health insurance system 
with a major role for public financing and a broad re-
spect for the private provision of health care. This system 
was the result of several decades of incremental reform, 
legislated and implemented by various governments. While 
it was a fragmented and confusing system, nearly every- 
one had health insurance one way or another. About 65 
percent of the population with incomes below a certain 
level (32,600 euros in 2004) had compulsory health in- 
surance from one of the Sickness Funds and were auto- 
matically insured. This program was funded by general 
taxation (24%), by income-related contributions subsi- 
dized by employers (66%), and by community-rated in- 
dividual premiums (10%) [1]. 
In 2006, the three-tiered mix of public and private 
health insurance in the Netherlands was gradually re- 
placed by a new, more competitive health insurance sys- 
tem as covered in the Health Insurance Act (HIA). The 
HIA was preceded by a series of more market-oriented 
reforms since the early 1990s [2]. It was a response to 
health care costs that had risen sharply and to a growing 
dissatisfaction with the existence of two parallel health 
insurance systems. It was considered unfair that each of 
these systems had a different set of rules [1]. 
The Netherlands, like many OECD countries, combine 
a mandatory basic health insurance with a voluntary sup-
plementary health insurance [2]. In the HIA, the govern- 
ment no longer sponsors health insurance. In the new 
system, consumers are considered as rational individuals 
choosing health insurance wisely and willing to switch 
plans if dissatisfied. Health insurers compete on prices 
for the basic health insurance policy. The basic insurance 
packages are comparable, there is universal access, ac- 
ceptance by insurance providers is mandatory, and the 
market could be considered as one with managed compe- 
tition. In addition, supplementary insurances were pro- 
vided to consumers differing on both costs and quality. 
The supplementary packages are voluntary to consumers, 
but there is no obligatory acceptance by the insurance 
company, and companies are allowed to use medical 
underwriting. The basic and supplementary insurance are 
(basically) always provided by the same health insurer. 
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One important incentive for insurance companies to 
compete on price and quality draws upon consumer switch- 
ing behavior. In 2006, the overall switching rate was 
about 20 percent. After 2006, the percentage of con- 
sumers switching their health insurance policy dramati- 
cally decreases to about four percent in 2009 [3]. Health 
insurers are no longer required to contract with all pro- 
viders but they are rather encouraged to choose on the 
basis of negotiated arrangements with the providers they 
determine to be the best [1]. If consumers do not con- 
sider their health insurers as contractors of health care, 
the health insurers may not be encouraged to negotiate 
the best arrangements. 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the HIA from 2006 
onwards, with a focus on consumer switching behavior 
in particular. Therefore, we complement the study of Roos 
and Schut [2] in two particular ways. First, Roos and 
Schut focus on spillover effects, mostly from an insur- 
ance company perspective, whereas we review the health 
insurance market from a consumer perspective, with an 
in depth analysis of switching behavior. Second, in our 
analysis, we also consider the role of group purchases, 
since over 60 percent of Dutch citizens is a member of a 
group purchase agreement. 
For this purpose, we describe switching behavior 
among Dutch consumers during the last few years. The 
measurement and evaluation of the switching behavior 
among the Dutch consumers is preceded by a description 
of the premises underlying the HIA. In particular, it is 
presumed that consumers are able to gather all relevant 
information and consequently that they are able to use 
this information properly in their decision making pro- 
cess. We evaluate whether these conditions were fulfilled. 
Furthermore, we study the varying factors related to 
switching plans in the period from 2006 to 2011. Finally, 
this study provides insights into reasons why, or why not, 
Dutch consumers switch their health care insurance. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the fol- 
lowing section, background information regarding the 
Dutch health insurance system is provided followed by 
the etiology of this system. After a description of the 
design of the methods and data we present the results on 
switching in. The final section provides a conclusion and 
discussion. 
1.1. Dutch Health Insurance 
As of January 1st, 2006, the Dutch Administration in- 
troduced the HIA, a system of more regulated compete- 
tion with a mandate for individuals to purchase insurance. 
The HIA was the final step of market-orientation that 
was gradually implemented from the beginning of the 
1990s [2,4,5]. The new system created competition in 
three areas. First, health insurers function as contractors 
of health care. They are no longer required to contract 
with all providers of health care but they are rather en- 
couraged to choose on the basis of negotiated arrange- 
ments resulting in the lowest cost and best quality. Sec-
ondly, competition was created by the introduction of 
Diagnosis Related Groups in hospital care [6]. And third, 
competition was created in the health insurance market 
between consumers and insurance companies, as Dutch 
consumers are allowed to switch their insurance com-
pany (or insurance package) each year. This article eva- 
luates the functioning of the third market in which con-
sumers have a free choice between insurance companies 
during annual enrolment (November-January). 
The aim of this system is to create a competitive market 
in which consumers would switch health plans and sti- 
mulate insurers to price competition and quality im- 
provement. The standardized basic insurance is fairly 
comprehensive and obligatory for all Dutch citizens. The 
universal package covers, amongst others, hospitalization, 
prescription drugs, and maternity care [2]. 
Health insurers are required to accept all applicants for 
the basic insurance [7]. In addition to the basic insurance, 
Dutch consumers are allowed to voluntarily buy a sup- 
plementary policy covering care from, for instance, den- 
tists, opticians, and physiotherapists. However, for the 
supplementary insurance, insurers are no longer required 
to accept these consumers and may require medical un- 
derwriting before acceptance. 
The literature suggests that individuals switch when 
they are confronted with cheaper health plans [8], but the 
difference in prices should be worth the trouble of 
switching in terms of time and administrative hassle. 
Crucial are therefore differences in price, for the basic 
health insurance policy in particular, since these pack- 
ages are comparable. Because the basic insurance holds a 
universal and obligatory acceptance by all insurance 
companies, consumers are free to choose their company. 
Small differences might not result in substantial im- 
provements in the efficiency of health care. However, 
Roos and Schut [2] show that about 90% of the Dutch 
citizens also have a supplementary insurance that may 
have restrictions on acceptance by the insurance com- 
pany. Due to the differences in supplementary packages, 
combined with potential rejection and potential age dis- 
crimination, availability, quality and, and price of the 
supplementary policy are considered important for con- 
sumers in deciding whether to switch. And despite the 
fact that the basic and supplementary policies are auto- 
nomous by law, most Dutch people perceive their insur- 
ance as one product and think that they have an obligation 
to buy the basic and supplementary insurance from one 
company (approximately 60 percent in our survey). 
1.2. Etiology of Health Plan Switching 
The literature suggests that several factors are involved in 
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the process of health plan switching. Although basic in-
surance packages are comparable, health plans are not 
considered as homogeneous products in the Netherlands 
[9]. This is because over 90 percent of Dutch consumers 
have a supplementary insurance [2] that deviates among 
insurance providers and the basic and supplementary 
insurance are assumed to being bought from one com-
pany. This would be an argument to include information 
related to both price and quality of insurance products in 
switching studies. 
Price is generally considered an important factor [10]. 
A study in the US shows that price increases generally 
increase switching [11]. On the other hand, price does 
not always determine switching behavior [12]. The low 
percentage of switching can also be explained by the 
status quo bias; tendency of people to leave things as 
they are [13]. Switching may in some cases be the result 
of calculated anticipation of specific needs for medical 
care. Specifically when insurance companies use medical 
underwriting, or consumers are afraid of not being ac-
cepted by a new insurance company, consumers may not 
be able to attract a better supplementary contract. This is 
the so called lock-in effect [2]. Dormont et al. [14] have 
shown this effect using data from Switzerland, which has 
a system that is fairly comparable to the Dutch HIA. 
Another argument to switch from insurance company 
is the opportunity to join a purchasing group. Collective 
offers from purchasing groups have been shown to be 
one of the main arguments to switch, although it is not 
clear why consumers join these groups. Lower premiums 
might be a reason, but higher quality of the insurance 
product [15] as well. As a result, switching always seems 
voluntary, but when consumers are enrolled in a collec- 
tive offer via their employer and change careers, they 
have an obligatory reason to switch their insurance pro- 
duct. 
Furthermore, (perceived) availability is important to 
consider when studying switching behavior. Switching, 
for instance, is not without transaction costs. Searching 
involves time and the question is whether consumers will 
actually be accepted for the supplementary policy or 
need to fill in a medical underwriting [2]. This may have 
a discouraging effect. Moreover, too much choice [16] 
might keep consumers from switching at all. Roos and 
Schut [2] show that about 30 insurance companies pro- 
vide supplementary insurance, with many different pack- 
ages per company. Quality of information plays a role 
here, because one could question whether consumers are 
able to compare all different insurance plans. Quality of 
information has been shown to have a small effect on 
switching [15], but other studies do not confirm this out- 
come [17]. 
In addition, studies into health status reveal that healthy 
individuals tend to switch more than those who are sick 
[9]. The same applies for well-educated individuals 
compared to lower educated individuals [9]. Finally, 
when we look at socio-demographic variables, we see the 
following outcomes: younger people tend to switch more 
than elderly people, but for gender and living status the 
literature mentions varying relationships with switching 
behavior [9]. 
2. METHOD 
We employed three surveys to obtain in depth insight 
into consumer switching behavior, but also why con- 
sumers seem to neglect the opportunities to switch health 
insurance in more recent years. The first two surveys 
were completed in cooperation with radio Noorderlicht, 
the latter in cooperation with its successor, i.e. Labyrint 
radio. All three programs cover scientific news. And as 
such, on average, our respondents are more highly edu- 
cated compared to the average Dutch population. How- 
ever, as Hurenkamp and Kramer [18] show, highly edu- 
cated people are better able to deal with rational decision 
problems. Therefore, when we find that this group en-
counters difficulties in finding the right information, and 
making the right decision, this result will be even worse 
for the entire Dutch population. We will consider this 
bias when discussing the results. 
The first survey aims at creating a deeper under- 
standing of health insurance switching in the Netherlands 
during the introduction of the HIA in 2006. Respon- 
dents were allowed to complete the survey between 
the 6th and 19th of March 2007 on the radio’s website  
(http://noorderlicht.vpro.nl). The survey was completed 
by 478 respondents. Over thirty-five percent was female. 
The average time to complete the survey was approxi- 
mately three minutes. 
The 2005-2006 survey primarily aimed to develop in-
sight into people’s switching behavior. Respondents were 
asked: “did you recently switch to another health plan?” 
(Yes/No). After this question we were particularly in- 
terested in finding out why consumers switched their 
health insurance. They were queried about the reasons 
for doing so (premium, group purchasing plans etc.). 
Moreover, information about socio-demographic variables 
was included in the questionnaire, including age, gender, 
and education level. Along the lines of previous studies 
(e.g. [19]) we included the following variables in our 
survey: premium per month, membership of a purchasing 
plan, expectations about improved service, and dissatis- 
faction with the previous health insurance company. The 
variables were measured on a 5-point scale from 1 
(hardly) to 5 (very much) in order to create a hierarchy 
among these determinants. 
The 2009 survey was completed by 389 respondents. 
This survey focuses on health plan switching in Novem- 
ber 2008-January 2009. The primary aim of this survey 
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was to find out why relatively few consumers actually 
switch their insurance plan. This question gained impor-
tance as the percentage of consumers switching health 
plans dramatically decreases from 20 percent in 2006 to 
four percent in 2009 [3]. Additionally, this latter ques-
tionnaire distinguishes between non-switchers not having 
considered changing their health care insurance and non- 
switchers that did re-evaluate their opportunities, but in 
the end deliberately decided not to switch their insurance 
plans [7]. Respondents were allowed to fill in this survey 
in April 2009. The final survey (n = 190) was available 
in February 2011 for respondents to fill in. This was a 
relatively small survey, used to gain some extra insight 
into non-switching behavior, for instance related to the 
expectation of not being accepted [2] and the opportunity 
to find the right insurance. All surveys were designed to 
include respondents with a health insurance. These are 
Dutch people aged 18 years and older as children have 
free insurance with their parents. A paired samples t-test 
was used to uncover differences between groups. In ad-
dition, Anova testing was used. 
3. RESULTS 
After the introduction of the HIA in 2006, 31.6 percent 
of the survey respondents changed their health plan. In 
the Netherlands as a whole this was almost 20 percent. 
Similarly, our results show that over ten percent of our 
respondents switched their health plans in 2009 and 2011, 
whereas this was about four to five percent in the entire 
country. Table 1 displays a description of the respon- 
dents in the three surveys. 
The average age of our respondents was 46.1 (2005- 
2006), 46.3 (2008-2009) and 49.2 years, respectively. Age 
is normally distributed. The level of education is rela- 
tively high. In the Netherlands as a whole, the percentage 
of people holding a higher education or university degree 
is approximately 28 percent [20]. The difference between 
the percentages can be explained by the sampling met- 
hod, as discussed in the previous section. Radio Noor-
derlicht and Labyrint radio primarily focus on scientific 
novelties. As a result, the average listener to this program 
is more highly educated. However, individuals with higher 
levels of education have been shown to search more  
 
Table 1. Respondent characteristics. 
 2005-2006  (n = 478) 
2008-2009  
(n = 389) 
2010-2011 
(n = 190) 
Switched 31.6% 10.2% 14.0% 
Male 64.4% 60.7% 66.4% 
Female 35.6% 39.3% 33.6% 
Age 46.1 (sd. = 13.9) 46.3 (sd. = 14.7) 49.2 (sd. = 17.4)
Higher education 78.7% 74.8% 74.3% 
often for information and are better able to compare this 
information [18]. Hence, whenever the results would in- 
dicate that even this group of highly educated consumers 
has problems finding or comparing the information on 
health plans, the results will even be worse for lower edu- 
cated consumers. No structural biases were found between 
the three surveys, using Anova testing (not in table). 
3.1. Switching in 2006 
The new health care system created a relatively high 
mobility of consumers switching in the first year. In our 
sample, 31.6 percent deliberately chose a different health 
plan, considerably more than in the whole Dutch popu- 
lation (20%). The same question was asked in the 2008- 
2009 survey. Table 2 shows that over 10 percent of our 
respondents changed their health care insurance plan in 
2008-2009. This percentage is higher than the countries’ 
average of approximately four percent [3], but lower than 
the percentage of 2005-2006. The switching behavior 
and the independent variables in this study are presented 
in Table 2. Table 3 compares the outcomes on the inde- 
pendent variables from the first two surveys, using a 
paired samples t-test. We start with discussing the aver-
age results of 2005-2006 as presented in Table 2. Results 
can ultimately deviate between 1 (hardly) to 5 (very 
much), using a five points Likert scale. 
 
Table 2. Factors explaining switching health plans: Average 
and standard deviation. 
 2005-2006 (n = 478) 2008-2009 (n = 389)
Percentage of switching 
consumers 31.5 10.2 
Monthly premium 3.70 (1.40) 3.57 (1.65) 
Membership of a purchasing 
group 3.46 (1.65) 2.05 (1.62) 
Service 2.77 (1.42) 2.80 (1.52) 
Dissatisfaction with previous 
insurance company 2.04 (1.37) 2.43 (1.39) 
 
Table 3. Factors explaining switching health plans (Paired sam- 
ples t-test, p-values). 
 2005-2006 2008-2009
Monthly premium versus membership  
of a purchasing group 0.155 0.001
** 
Monthly premium versus service 0.000** 0.023* 
Monthly premium versus dissatisfaction 
with previous insurance company 0.000
** 0.002** 
Membership of a purchasing group 
versus service 0.000
** 0.061 
Membership of a purchasing group 
versus dissatisfaction with previous 
insurance company 
0.000** 0.319 
Service versus dissatisfaction with  
previous insurance company 0.000
** 0.020* 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. 
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The first item, monthly premium, refers to monthly 
payments and whether consumers received a cheaper 
opportunity for their health care insurance. The question 
is whether this stimulated consumers to switch their 
health insurance. With an average of 3.70 and a standard 
deviation of 1.40 this item clearly contributed to ex- 
plaining switching behavior. Purchasing group, service, 
and dissatisfaction towards the former insurance com-
pany scored 3.46, 2.77 and 2.04, respectively. This 
means that on average the monthly premium was most 
important for the decision to switch, followed by mem-
bership of a purchasing group, service, and dissatisfac- 
tion towards the former insurance company. 
To verify whether the measured differences are sig-
nificant, we used a paired sample t-test (Table 3). De- 
spite the mean difference of 0.24, the results between 
monthly premium and membership of a purchasing group 
do not differ significantly for 2005-2006 when explain- 
ing switching behavior (p = 0.155). On the other hand, 
monthly premium and membership of a purchasing group 
are not associated significantly. 
When reflecting on the other measured differences we 
see that results are significant at the 1% level (see Table 
3). These results suggest that there was a relatively 
strong hierarchy among explanatory variables, in which 
good opportunities in terms of monthly premiums and/or 
group purchases induced consumers to switch more than 
the expectation to receive better service at this new firm. 
Dissatisfaction towards the former insurance company 
was the least explanatory factor. 
In line with our expectations, consumers’ sex does not 
have any influence on their switching behavior (not in 
table). Age has a negative coefficient, but the result is 
insignificant. Education also lacks significance. This result, 
however, may be due to our population, which is rela- 
tively homogeneous and on average highly educated.  
3.2. Developments between 2006 and 20091 
Before we continue with the results from 2009, a con- 
cise reflection on the developments between 2006 and 
2009 is necessary. One of the aims of establishing a more 
competitive health insurance market was to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of health care, which con- 
tributes to decreasing costs of the total health care system. 
For Dutch consumers, however, the costs of the new 
system increased significantly. In addition to the in- 
creased monthly premium, another policy change in- 
creased the costs for consumers. A co-payment was in- 
troduced in 2006. This co-payment implied that when 
consumers did not use service from the basic health care 
plans, they were reimbursed by the end of the year. It 
appeared that the instrument did not reduce medical 
consumption. As a result, the co-payment was replaced 
by an obligatory “own risk”, which implied that Dutch 
consumers have to pay themselves for their initial costs 
when basic health care is necessary [1], i.e. €220 for 2012. 
In addition, the costs of health care in broad sense in-
creased relatively strong. To restore premiums, and cre- 
ate economies of scale, mergers and acquisitions among 
insurance providers were necessary for becoming viable. 
In the end, however, only four big players were left cov- 
ering over 80 percent of the total market. These big play- 
ers subsequently restored their premiums, resulting in 
higher monthly premiums for Dutch consumers. In 2006 
they had suffered a predictable loss of about 30 percent 
on the highest decile of health care users [2]. Moreover, 
there were fewer opportunities to choose from and it 
seems there was only limited competition. After 2006, 
the monthly premium strongly converged between insur-
ance companies [21], especially for the basic insurance. 
Consequently, perceived differences were limited and the 
incentives for consumers to switch decreased. Moreover, 
when only a limited percentage of consumers switch 
health plans, there is only limited need for health insur-
ance companies to actually engage in strong competition, 
leaving them with the opportunity to restore premiums. 
Furthermore, over 60 percent of Dutch consumers is a 
member of a purchasing group. This enabled the creation 
of volume discounts. Consumers involved in a group 
purchase (mostly via their employer) therefore either re- 
ceived a discount on their monthly premiums, or gained 
additional coverage and service for the same price. The 
effect, however, is that they no longer actively search for 
better opportunities, whereas this is one of the assump- 
tions of rational decision making and efficient market. 
Hence, one of the aims of the 2008-2009 survey was to 
study whether consumers decided not to switch their 
health insurance after active comparisons and careful 
deliberation, or whether consumers simply accepted the 
situation without any critical reflection. 
3.3. Results 2008-2009 
It is interesting to investigate whether the reasons to 
switch health care insurance among respondents changed 
over the years. These results are included in Tables 2 
and 3. Table 2 enables us to assess how much each item 
contributes to consumers switching their health care in- 
surance company. The first item (monthly premium), has 
an average score of 3.57 and a standard deviation of 1.56. 
In 2008-2009 this factor most prominently contributed to 
explaining switching behavior, which is comparable to 
2005-2006. Membership of a purchasing group, on the 
other hand, strongly decreased between 2005-2006 and 
2008-2009. The average score is 2.05 and the standard 
deviation is much less than the 3.46 of three years before. 
1The reason to include the developments section here facilitates the 
transition from the 2006 to the 2009 results. 
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Service shows an average result of 2.80, whereas dissat-
isfaction towards former insurance provider results in an 
average score of 2.43 and a standard deviation of 1.39. 
Results changed from 2006 to 2009 (see Table 3), 
creating a different hierarchy among explaining determi- 
nants. Monthly premium is still most important when 
explaining switching behavior. Significant results occur 
when comparing the mean average of monthly premiums 
with service (at the 5 percent level) and membership of a 
purchasing group and dissatisfaction towards former in- 
surance company (at the 1 percent level). As a result, the 
relevance of purchasing groups in explaining the switch- 
ing behavior decreased, since the measured difference in 
2005-2006 was insignificantly different from monthly 
premium. This decreased relevance was also confirmed 
by the other results. In 2005-2006 membership of a pur- 
chasing group was significantly more important than ser- 
vice in explaining switching behavior (see Table 3). In 
2008-2009, the average score of service is even higher 
than the result of purchasing groups (2.80 and 2.05, re- 
spectively). 
Three results about dissatisfaction with the previous 
insurance company are worth mentioning. First, a com-
parison of the primary results of 2005-2006 (mean = 2.04) 
and 2008-2009 (mean = 2.43) suggests that this variable 
gained importance. The reasoning is as follows: as a re- 
sult of earlier opportunities to switch their insurance plan, 
consumers indeed switched their insurance company. 
Sometimes, however, this behavior caused dissatisfaction 
due to postponed payment, complex request submission 
procedures, and worse customer service etc. Essentially, 
these consumers decided to switch back again to their 
previous insurance provider. A second interesting result, 
and similar to the comparison between purchasing group 
and service, is that membership of a purchasing group is 
no longer more important than dissatisfaction when ex- 
plaining switching behavior (p = 0.319). Dissatisfaction 
even has a higher average score in the 2008-2009 meas- 
urement. Finally, perceived service is significantly more 
important than dissatisfaction at the 5 percent level. 
As mentioned before, less than four percent [3] of 
Dutch consumers decided to switch their health insur- 
ance policy in 2008-2009. Hence, in addition to re-test- 
ing the 2005-2006 result, we included questions con- 
cerning the importance of certain factors explaining 
health care insurance plan selection. In this way we were 
able to further explore switching and non-switching be- 
havior (n = 389). Results are displayed in Table 4. 
When reflecting on monthly premium we find a sig- 
nificant difference between the perceived relevance of 
monthly premium when comparing switchers and non- 
switchers (p < 0.01). This result is in line with our earlier 
findings, as monthly contribution remains the main ar- 
gument to switch insurance policies (see Tables 2 and 3).  
Table 4. Explanatory factors for choosing a insurance company: 
Averages and differences (2008-2009). 
 Switchers(n = 40)
Non switchers 
(n = 349) 
Significant  
difference (p-values)
Monthly premium 4.00 3.16 0.000** 
Trust 3.67 3.56 0.595 
Convenience 3.07 3.56 0.013* 
Service 3.48 3.55 0.707 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. 
 
Furthermore, switchers and non-switchers do not differ 
significantly on trust and service. In other words, both 
the trust in the insurance company and perceived service 
are valued fairly similarly by switchers and non-switch- 
ers. Finally, however, we find a significant difference in 
perceived convenience. This result is significant at the 
5% level. Non-switchers deliberately decide to stay with 
their insurance policy as a result of perceived conven-
ience. Switchers, on the other hand, perceive a lower 
level of convenience. This triggers them to search for a 
better opportunity. 
As mentioned before, the average percentage of switch- 
ers dramatically decreased throughout the years. The 
policy of the Dutch Administration, however, assumes 
that consumers acting as rational individuals [9] are at 
least willing to re-evaluate their health insurance deci-
sions, whereas the convenience results suggest differ-
ently. Therefore, we subdivided the non-switchers into 
non-switchers not having considered changing their 
health care insurance, and non-switchers that re-evalu- 
ated their opportunities, but in the end deliberately de-
cided not to switch their insurance plan [7]. An evalua-
tion of both groups enables us to verify whether future 
incentives at this insurance market might be useful. The 
sample consists of 389 respondents, of whom 40 re- 
spondents switched their health care insurance. Out of 
the remaining 349 respondents, 112 respondents indi- 
cated having reconsidered whether or not to change their 
insurance plan. In other words, despite the ambitions of 
the Dutch Administration, 237 respondents (far over 50%) 
do not even consider changing their health care insurance. 
Hence, for the purpose of evaluating non-switching 
behavior we asked these 349 respondents why they did 
not change their health care insurance. Results are dis-
played in Table 5, measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
hardly to 5 = very much). Although both groups decided 
not to switch their health care insurance, many signifi-
cant differences occur. Starting with non-switchers that 
considered switching their insurance company we find 
three interesting results. First, and in line with our ex-
pectations, non-switchers that considered switching per-
ceive too limited differences when comparing monthly 
premiums. Moreover, this group either finds insufficient 
information among good alternatives, or the information 
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they found was too complex to make a well informed 
decision. These results are important and suggest that 
many people are willing to consider a switch, but are not 
able to make the right decision with the current informa-
tion. This is in line with Roos and Schut [2] who also 
propose an improvement concerning information deliv-
ery. Essentially then, the relatively high costs of search-
ing outweigh the potential benefits of good alternatives. 
A model based on the “virtual guardian angel” as sug-
gested by Poiesz and Van Raaij [22] could contribute to 
this problem by introducing a helpdesk for consumers 
improving their health insurance.  
An even larger group of respondents, however, does 
not even consider switching their health care insurance. 
This group is satisfied with current service of their in- 
surance provider and monthly contribution they have to 
pay. Moreover, this group presumes that their purchasing 
group is simply the best alternative. Hence, as a result 
these consumers hardly search for better alternatives, 
which seems contradictory to the initial intentions of the 
government introducing the market-oriented health in- 
surance system.  
3.4. Future Markets 
We now explore future opportunities for improving 
the health care insurance market. A necessary condition 
for competition among insurance companies is sufficient  
switching behavior among Dutch consumers. A lack of 
mobility would result in a limited incentive for insurance 
providers to develop distinguishing characteristics, inter 
alia related to monthly premiums and provided service. 
Hence, Table 6 displays the arguments that might con-
tribute to more switching behavior. In other words, this 
table shows what changes are necessary to increase the 
mobility of Dutch consumers in the health care insurance 
market. We again subdivided the non-switchers into two 
groups: non-switchers not having considered changing 
their health care insurance and non-switchers that did 
consider changing their health care insurance. Results are 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = hardly to 5 = 
very much). 
Table 6 shows that monthly premium, service, and 
dissatisfaction towards insurance provider are decisive 
for future switching behavior. This result concerns both 
groups. Most striking in Table 6, however, are the main 
differences between both groups. The differences on all 
items are significant (either at the 1, or 5 percent level). 
These results suggest that the first group indeed consid-
ered switching their insurance company; however, the 
perceived differences were not persuasive enough to ac- 
tually change their insurance plan. The latter group seems 
relatively indifferent; even though differences would be 
significant, it remains unlikely that this group will act- 
ually change their health care insurance. 
 
Table 5. Reasons for not switching health care insurance (2008-2009). 
 
Non-switchers; switching 
considered 
(n = 112) 
Non-switchers; switching 
not considered 
(n = 237) 
Significant difference 
(p-values) 
Insufficient differences on premium 3.45 2.71 0.000** 
Satisfied with service current insurance provider 3.32 3.90 0.000** 
Lacking opportunities for membership of a purchasing group 2.25 2.08 0.273 
Insufficient information about alternatives 2.69 2.32 0.009** 
Information about alternatives was too complex 3.43 2.77 0.000** 
Purchasing group was already considered as the best alternative 2.19 2.83 0.000** 
Satisfied with current monthly premium 2.88 3.19 0.001** 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. 
 
Table 6. Future arguments to switch health care insurance (2008-2009). 
 Non-switchers; switching considered(n = 112) 
Non-switchers; switching not considered 
(n = 237) 
Significant difference 
(p-values) 
Larger differences in monthly premiums 4.19 3.63 0.000** 
Larger differences in service 4.09 3.76 0.007** 
More opportunities for purchasing groups 2.96 2.66 0.048* 
Dissatisfaction with current insurance company 3.60 3.33 0.042* 
Simplified switching procedures 3.34 2.88 0.005** 
Opportunities to switch several times a year 2.48 1.80 0.000** 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. 
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For the first group, at least having considered switch-
ing their health care insurance, an interesting question 
remains whether perceived differences indeed are rela-
tively small, or whether differences are in fact large 
enough, but companies are unable to communicate this 
effectively. This latter premise would be in line with 
results from Switzerland [23]. Regardless of the argu- 
ments underlying the non-switching behavior, stagnation 
of the insurance market may result consequently. When- 
ever consumers have not even considered switching in- 
surance providers, stimulating this group of consumers 
seems nearly impossible. Consumers that did consider 
switching their health care insurance simply demand 
stronger and better communicated differences. If this 
necessary improvement does not occur, a further decline 
of the health care insurance market seems to be likely. 
3.5. Results 2010-2011 
As mentioned earlier, our final survey was executed in 
2011. This was a relatively small survey, explicitly ques-
tioning why Dutch consumers did not decide to switch 
their basic or supplementary insurance. One of the issues 
mentioned by Roos and Schut [2] was that consumers in 
the Netherlands were afraid of not being accepted for the 
supplementary policy. This issue is particularly impor-
tant, because 60 percent of our survey respondents be-
lieve that the basic and supplementary insurance are in-
terconnected. Our results show that 41 percent of our 
respondents is afraid of not being accepted when apply-
ing for a new supplementary insurance. Moreover, this 
survey also shows that these highly educated people have 
difficulties finding the right alternatives. 64 percent of 
the respondents states not being able to find a good al- 
ternative insurance product and 72 percent of the re- 
spondents mentions having difficulties understanding the 
insurance market. However, also the seemingly indiffer-
ence remains important. 78 percent of the respondents is 
unwilling to change each year, whereas 81 percent thinks 
switching is useless because the differences are too small 
(results not in table).  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Our research complied with the Helsinki Declaration if 
applicable. According to the Dutch “Medical Research 
involving human subjects Act”, our study did not require 
ethics approval by a medical ethics committee.  
The Netherlands introduced the new Health Insurance 
Act (HIA) in 2006, combining mandatory basic insur-
ance for each citizen with an opportunity to voluntarily 
buy a supplementary insurance. The reason was that 
health care costs had risen sharply and this system con- 
tributes to more market-orientation. The basic insurance 
packages are comparable, and there is a mandatory ac-
ceptance by insurance providers, whereas there is no 
obligatory acceptance for supplementary insurance, and 
insurance companies may even require medical under-
writing [2]. 
Within the HIA, Dutch consumers are allowed to switch 
their health plan once a year, and this behavior was 
thought to stimulate insurance companies competing on 
price and quality. For basic insurance, insurance compa-
nies could have competed on price only. However, and 
despite formal law requirements stressing that the basic 
insurance and supplementary insurance should be treated 
separately, 60 percent of our survey respondents believe 
both insurance products are interconnected. As such, both 
quality and price of the entire health insurance product 
are important. 
In 2006, the introduction of the HIA resulted in a mo-
bility of almost 20 percent among Dutch consumers na-
tion wide. The results from the 2005-2006 survey show 
that the most important factors to change health insur-
ance were monthly premium and membership of a pur-
chasing group, whereas company service and dissatisfac-
tion towards the insurance company were less important. 
During the following years, however, the percentage of 
consumers switching their health plan decreased to four 
to five percent. Furthermore, many mergers and acquisi-
tions occurred, resulting in four big players covering the 
market. The 2008-2009 survey therefore also gained in-
sights into why consumers do not change their insurance 
policy. Firstly, consumers perceived too limited monthly 
premium differences. Secondly, they were satisfied with 
the service of the current insurance provider and perceive 
the current state as being convenient, not adjusting their 
insurance package. And finally, if they actively searched 
for information, they perceived the information as being 
too complex or difficult to compare, resulting in non- 
switching behavior.  
These results were confirmed in the 2010-2011 survey. 
In addition, one of the issues mentioned by Roos and 
Schut [2] was that consumers in the Netherlands were 
afraid of not being accepted for the supplementary policy. 
This issue is particularly important, because consumers 
also believe the basic and supplementary insurance are 
interconnected. Our results show that 41 percent of our 
respondents are afraid of not being accepted when ap- 
plying for a new supplementary insurance. Moreover, 
this survey also shows that these highly educated people 
have difficulties finding the right alternatives. But the 
larger proportion of the Dutch consumers simply seems 
indifferent to change opportunities; they believe switch- 
ing is useless because the differences are too small.  
Stagnation of the insurance market may result. When- 
ever consumers have not even considered switching in- 
surance providers, stimulating this group of consumers 
seems relatively ineffective, which seems contradictory 
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to the initial idea of managed competition with rational 
consumers. Consumers that did consider switching their 
health care insurance demand stronger and better com- 
municated differences. With only four big players one 
could question whether insurance companies have a suf- 
ficient incentive to compete with each other. 
Future Developments 
What could be effective strategies of the Dutch gov-
ernment to increase switching behavior, increasing mar-
ket competition among insurance providers? First, and in 
line with Roos and Schut [2], the government could re- 
move the links between basic and supplementary insur- 
ance packages. Since there is a mandatory acceptance for 
basic insurance, this would stimulate consumers to con- 
sider switching their basic insurance alone. Second, the 
Dutch government could re-introduce a mandatory ac- 
ceptance for the supplementary insurance. Roos and 
Schut [2] suggest to better communicate underwriting 
practices and policy acceptance. However, since there 
seems to be a low rejection rate anyway, the best solution 
in our view is to have mandatory acceptance for both the 
basic insurance and supplementary insurance, which 
would strongly improve the potential mobility of Dutch 
consumers. Finally, communication could be improved. 
As our surveys show, even the highly educated people in 
the Netherlands have problems finding the right informa- 
tion to compare insurance packages. A “virtual guardian 
angel” model as suggested by Poiesz & Van Raaij [22] 
might help consumers in improving their decision mak- 
ing.  
This study, naturally, is subject to several limitations. 
First, our samples are relatively small. Second, our data 
is biased towards highly educated people. As mentioned 
before, however, we expect results to be even worse 
among lower educated people. Finally, there might have 
been an influence of the global credit crunch, which we 
did not include in our measurement. It will be interesting 
to follow the future developments of the insurance mar-
ket. Furthermore, in-depth exploration is necessary of the 
possibility of a “virtual guardian angel” model as well as 
of the effects of a mandatory acceptance for supplemen-
tary insurances on switching behavior.  
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